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ABSTRACT 
 
TIMOTHY C. ROBINSON: Strategic Mortgage Default, Religion, and Social Norms 
(Under the direction of Robert Connolly) 
 
 
 Using a large national dataset of individual mortgage loans, we find that the social 
norms and moral barometers captured by local religious adherence, unionization rates, and 
racial composition influence a borrower’s willingness to pay back his or her mortgage.  
Homeowners living in more religious areas are slightly less likely to enter mortgage 
foreclosure.  Consistent with previous research, which finds that Hispanics are more 
accepting of strategic default, we find that individuals living in communities with higher 
fractions of Hispanic residents are more likely to enter foreclosure.  Importantly, these effects 
are different for borrowers defaulting involuntarily due to liquidity constraints and borrowers 
likely defaulting voluntarily due to significant negative housing equity.  For borrowers with 
lower levels of current housing equity (high original LTV and/or low home price 
appreciation), a higher level of religious adherence, a smaller Hispanic population fraction, 
and a higher rate of private unionization are all associated with a lower likelihood that a 
borrower will be in foreclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
 It has become widely accepted that non-economic considerations such as morality are 
deterring many underwater mortgage borrowers from voluntarily defaulting on their home 
loans.  Roger Lowenstein, in his 2010 article “Walk Away From Your Mortgage,” implores 
borrowers to overcome their moral objections and simply do what is in their economic 
interest.1 
 This study will evaluate the relative importance of economic factors versus non-
economic factors such as morality and social pressure in homeowner decisions related to 
mortgage delinquency and default.  These findings are tremendously important for both 
economists and policymakers.   
 Lenders and mortgage investors normally evaluate borrowers along two broad 
dimensions: ability to pay and willingness to pay.  A borrower’s ability to pay is generally 
much easier to quantify.  Metrics such as debt to income ratios and the size of the down 
payment give lenders important information regarding a borrower’s capacity to make his or 
her mortgage payment.  A borrower’s FICO score has traditionally been a reliable indicator 
of his or her willingness to remain current on financial obligations.  But as an unprecedented 
number of mortgage borrowers confront significantly negative levels of housing equity, the 
willingness to pay for even high-FICO borrowers is being tested.  As of early 2010, 
                                                              
1 See, Lowenstein, Roger, “Walk Away from Your Mortgage!,” The New York Times, January 10, 2010. 
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approximately 15.2 million American households hold mortgages that exceed the value of 
their homes.2   
In the first quarter of 2008, the percentage of consumers current on credit cards and 
delinquent on mortgages was greater than the percentage current on their mortgages and 
delinquent on credit cards for the first time.  A recent study by TransUnion3 finds that this 
payment hierarchy has continued.  Much like www.condoflip.com helped investors profit 
during the housing boom, a website has been launched to help homeowners navigate the 
process of voluntarily walking away from their homes (www.youwalkaway.com).  The 
founders of this business will provide a cease-and-desist letter to stop the phone calls from 
the lender, an estimation of the number of days the borrower can live in the house payment 
free, and several other services.  On average, a delinquent borrower can live in his or her 
house for 438 days before actually being evicted.4 
 Guiso, et al (forthcoming) use survey data to examine the influence of moral and 
social considerations on mortgage default.  These authors note that millions of Americans 
currently have a mortgage that exceeds the value of their home.  Twenty two percent of 
American households are underwater in their current mortgage.  In some housing markets 
(Las Vegas and parts of California for example), over 50% are underwater.  While few 
homeowners would voluntarily walk away from a mortgage when they are only slightly 
underwater, residents in some housing markets are facing significantly negative levels 
                                                              
2 See, Zingales, Luigi, “The Menace of Strategic Default,” The New York Times, January 10, 2010. 
3 See, Blumberg, Dave, “New Payment Hierarchy May be Here to Stay,” 
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/rel_us_print.jsp?id=1111336, February 3, 2010. 
4 See, Streitfeld, David, “Owners Stop Paying Mortgage…And Stop Fretting About It,” The New York Times, May 
31, 2010. 
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mortgage equity.  For example, individuals who purchased homes in Salinas, CA in 2006 
have a median level of home equity of -$214,305. 
In addition to moral and social considerations, there are several economic factors that make 
homeowners reluctant to default even when they are underwater.  Moving involves relocation 
costs, and defaulting delivers a serious blow to an individual’s credit rating.  In most states, 
lenders have the right to pursue borrowers who walk away from mortgages.  While this 
deficiency judgment is unlikely unless the borrower has significant wealth aside from the 
home (too costly for lender), it is a risk that many borrowers may wish to avoid. 
 Using a large national dataset of individual mortgage loans, we find that the social 
norms and moral barometers captured by local religious adherence, unionization rates, and 
racial composition do indeed influence a borrower’s willingness to pay back his or her 
mortgage.  Homeowners living in more religious areas are slightly less likely to enter 
mortgage foreclosure.  Consistent with Guiso, et al, forthcoming, who find that Hispanics are 
more accepting of strategic default, we find that individuals living in communities with 
higher fractions of Hispanic residents are more likely to enter foreclosure.   
Importantly, the effects of moral and social factors are different for borrowers defaulting 
involuntarily due to liquidity constraints and borrowers likely defaulting voluntarily due to 
significant negative housing equity.  If the interaction between the level of housing equity 
and the social/moral factors is not accounted for, the effect of the social and moral factors is a 
small fraction of the effects of purely economic factors.  But for borrowers with lower levels 
of current housing equity (high original LTV and/or low home price appreciation), a higher 
level of religious adherence, a smaller Hispanic population fraction, and a higher rate of 
private unionization are all associated with a lower likelihood that a borrower will be in 
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foreclosure.  And the magnitudes of the effects of moving the social factors and the level of 
housing equity simultaneously are as large as or larger than many of the economic factors 
(FICO score for example). 
  Critical differences exist between primary residence properties and investment 
properties.  For an investor, the decision to default is almost entirely a financial decision 
driven primarily by the level of current equity.  For these borrowers, the moral and social 
factors play a very minor role.  But for borrowers who occupy their homes, the social and 
moral considerations play an important role in the default decision.  Also, borrowers living in 
the states with the lowest levels of current housing equity (CA, FL, AZ, NV) are more 
significantly influenced by social and moral factors.  Because of the lower home equity 
levels, these borrowers are much more likely to be considering strategic default. 
2. Relevant Literature 
Using a survey approach, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (forthcoming) find that 82% of 
respondents believe it is morally wrong to walk away from a mortgage that you can afford to 
pay (strategically default).  But interestingly, even in response to hypothetical survey 
questions where no money is actually on the line, this moral resistance (non-economic factor) 
is overcome by economic considerations when the level of negative equity is sufficiently 
high.  In addition to a moral resistance to strategic default, attitudes of these survey 
respondents related to mortgage default seem to be influenced by social pressures as well.  
People who know someone who has defaulted are more likely to be willing to default 
strategically.  Also, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of foreclosed 
properties in a respondent’s ZIP code increases the willingness of a respondent to 
strategically default by 23%.  But to date researchers have not attempted to compare the 
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relative importance of these non-economic factors to the economic incentives motivating 
mortgage default, the aim of this study. 
 Social norms and moral considerations have been shown to influence economic 
decisions in a variety of contexts.  Social psychologists define social norms as rules and 
standards that are understood by members of a group that guide and constrain social 
behavior.  According to social identity theory (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1981), 
individuals derive much of their personal identity from social group membership such as 
one’s nationality, ethnicity, religion, and occupation.  People tend to adopt and internalize the 
norms, values, and attributes of these groups.   
Religious groups are a particular type of social group that has been studied extensively, and 
have recently been shown to influence investment decisions made by corporate executives 
(Hilary and Hui, 2009).  Since social norm non-conformity yields disutility, individuals are 
expected to increasingly take on religious social norms as the extent of religious adherence of 
their social group increases (Akerlof, 1980).  We use the level of religious adherence of an 
area to gain insight into homeowners’ mortgage decisions.  Religious individuals are 
generally characterized as being especially risk averse (Miller and Hoffman, 1995; Hillary 
and Hui, 2009).  This risk aversion may lead religious individuals to feel the fear associated 
with a damaged credit rating and possible deficiency judgment particularly acutely.  White 
(2010) posits that individuals dramatically overestimate the damage of a lowered credit 
score, and he believes that this is one reason individuals refuse to walk away from deeply 
underwater mortgages.  Also, since lenders have up to five years in some states to issue a 
deficiency judgment to recoup their shortfall, more risk averse individuals may work 
especially hard to avoid foreclosure. 
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 Religious social norms may provide reminders of personal norms such as honesty and 
morality.  Experimental evidence suggests that simple reminders of a moral code promote 
less misreporting for personal gain (Mazar, et al. 2008).  In one of their experiments, the 
authors assume that all participants would like to maintain a positive self-concept as being 
honest.  Both treatment and control groups are monetarily incentivized to misreport 
performance on a math test for personal gain.  Before reporting performance and receiving a 
payout, subjects in the treatment (control) condition are asked to list as many of the Ten 
Commandments (ten books read in high school) as possible.  Subjects in the treatment 
condition misreported both (1) less than the control condition and (2) no differently than a 
separate control group of subjects who had no opportunity to misreport.  The authors 
conclude that simple moral reminders, or “attention to standards,” are effective in curbing 
misreporting for personal gain because they trigger a personal norm deviation cost from the 
self-concept of being honest. 
 Undoubtedly, moral considerations and local social norms affect homeowners’ 
willingness to strategically default on their mortgages.  But a critically important question 
remains that this study will directly address.  When compared to economic factors, what is 
the relative importance of these non-economic factors as homeowners contemplate strategic 
default?   
Dyreng, Mayew, and Williams (2010) find that firms operating in U.S. counties with higher 
levels of religious adherence engage in less aggressive financial reporting practices.  Grullon, 
Kanatas, and Weston (2010) find that firms located in more religious areas are less likely to 
be the target of class action securities lawsuits, to manipulate earnings through the use of 
accruals, or to backdate options. 
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As Glaeser and Redlick (2008) note, social capital increases area stability and promotes 
community investment.  Social capital is increased through group membership.  In addition 
to church involvement (religious adherence), unionization is another form of group 
membership that impacts social capital.  We assess the effects of both public and private 
unionization rates on the mortgage default decision. 
 In addition to the survey approach utilized in Guiso, et al (forthcoming), other studies 
have examined if a borrower’s race is predictive of the likelihood of mortgage foreclosure, 
but so far the evidence is decidedly mixed.  Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) find that Black 
borrowers have significantly higher default rates than White borrowers.  Ambrose and 
Capone (1998) hypothesize that minority borrowers view their current mortgage as having 
greater value than White borrowers because of the perceived costs of obtaining new credit.  
Their findings indicate that minority borrowers have a lower probability of foreclosure.  
Quercia, McCarthy, and Stegman (1995) find that minority borrowers exhibit a lower risk of 
default than nonminority borrowers.  This study differs from these studies in an important 
way.  While previous studies have examined the impact of individual borrower’s race, this 
study examines the effects of social mores that may differ in important ways depending on 
the racial composition of borrowers’ communities. 
 Zhu (2010) examines the effects of both a borrower’s race and the racial composition 
of a borrower’s community on the likelihood of mortgage prepayment and default.  This 
author finds that African American and Hispanic borrowers are less likely to default on their 
mortgages.  But interestingly whether or not a borrower lives in a minority community (less 
than 50% non-Hispanic white), does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of default. 
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Real or perceived discrimination in mortgage lending may motivate the generally more 
permissive attitudes toward strategic default among minority borrowers (Guiso, et al 
(forthcoming)).  Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1996) find that an applicant’s 
race still affects the probability of getting a mortgage even after accounting for economic 
factors such as debt burden, credit history, and other financial characteristics.  Charles, Hurst, 
and Stephens (2008) find that Blacks pay significantly higher rates than other borrowers 
when financing a new car.  However, Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) find no evidence 
of adverse pricing for minority subprime mortgage borrowers from the 2004-2006 period.  
Although not economically significant, these authors find that minority borrowers actually 
pay slightly lower rates. 
In an attempt to eradicate racial discrimination in home mortgage lending, Congress passed 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act in the 
1970s.  But it remained difficult to quantify the effects of discrimination until 1989 when the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was amended to require information on the disposition of all 
mortgage applications according to applicants’ race, gender, and income.  When the Munnell, 
Browne, McEneaney, Tootell (1996) article was initially published as a report from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1992, it generated a firestorm of media reports and 
studies both in support and in opposition.5  Following this landmark study, regulators 
                                                              
5 For example, see, Roberts, Paul C., “Banks in the Line of Fire,” The Washington Times, March 12, 1993 and 
Brimelow, Peter and Leslie Spencer, “The Hidden Clue,” Forbes, January 4, 1993 and 
Horne, David K., “Evaluating the Role of Race in Mortgage Lending,” FDIC Banking Review, Summer 1994 and 
Liebowitz, Stan J., “A Study That Deserves No Credit,” The Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1993 and 
Zandi, Mark, “Boston Fed’s Study Was Deeply Flawed,” American Banker, August 19, 1993.  
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increased licensing exams and the justice department increased its scrutiny of mergers and 
attempted to increase prosecution for discrimination.  Whether the uncovered mortgage 
discrimination is real or perceived is beyond the scope of this study, but it seems entirely 
reasonable to assume that the increased level public discourse affected the perceptions of 
mortgage lenders, particularly for borrowers who felt underserved (i.e. minorities).  These 
differing opinions regarding lenders likely impact attitudes related to the sanctity of mortgage 
contracts and the general social permissiveness of walking away from an underwater 
mortgage. 
 We obtain data that indicates the extent of general religiosity of an area (at the county 
level) from the Association of Religion Data Archives, annual union membership data by 
MSA from the website Unionstats.com (provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson), 
and county racial composition data from the Population Division, US Census Bureau .  Then, 
using the local geographic region as the social group, and generic traits of religious 
adherents, union members, and racial groups as the norms of this social group, we explore 
how religion, unionization rates, and local racial composition (operating as social norms) 
affect decisions related to mortgage delinquency and default.  Even if a particular borrower is 
not an active participant in a religious or union group or of a particular race, the likelihood 
that the borrower interacts with religious individuals, unionized workers, or members of a 
particular race as part of his or her broad social network increases in locations where a large 
fraction of the population is religious, unionized, or of a particular race. 
3. Empirical Modeling Strategy 
Broadly, an individual will default on his or her mortgage for one of two reasons: facing a 
liquidity shortfall or willingly exercising the default option (strategic default).  While some 
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factors contribute to both of these reasons, many factors distinctly affect only one or the 
other. 
 The situation accompanying a liquidity shortfall is clearly understood.  For a myriad 
reasons (job loss, unexpected medical bill, mortgage payment rate reset, etc.), a borrower 
may simply be unable to continue making his or her mortgage payment.  Previous research 
has documented many of the factors that help explain the likelihood of a liquidity shortfall 
(Guiso, et al, forthcoming; Bajari, Chu, Park, 2008 for example).  Campbell, Cocco (2011) 
develop a default model and note the importance of house prices (in determining housing 
equity), inflation, whether a homeowner is borrowing constrained (FICO), income and 
income growth, whether a borrower selects an adjustable-rate mortgage, whether a borrower 
has experienced a rate reset, and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.  All of these factors are 
included in our analysis. 
As is the case with this study, researchers are generally only able to observe borrower 
characteristics at loan origination.  Unfortunately, updated information regarding for example 
borrowers’ employment situation is not available.  As with previous studies, we use 
information available at the time of mortgage origination that helps predict the vulnerability 
of borrowers to negative economic shocks.  As in previous research (Bajari, Chu, Park, 
2008), borrowers with higher FICO scores are assumed to be better equipped to navigate the 
effects of a negative shock. 
As with previous researchers using the same dataset as this study (White, 2010 for example), 
the borrowers’ debt-to-income ratio is not available.  To capture the extent that borrower 
were stretching their financial capabilities to make this home purchase, we utilize the original 
loan-to-value ratio (LTV), a dummy variable for adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), a dummy 
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variable for interest only (IO), and a dummy variable for negative amortization (neg. am.).  It 
is widely accepted (Goodman, et al, 2008 for example) that borrowers selecting 
“affordability” mortgage products such as ARM, IO, and neg. am. are often stretching to 
purchase a home that they would not be able to afford if only traditional 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgage products were available. 
 The monthly payment shock induced by the initial reset of adjustable rate mortgages 
is often cited as a factor pushing borrowers into liquidity shortfalls.  To account for this 
possibility, we include a dummy variable set to one if a borrower has previously experienced 
a rate reset.  While borrowers’ current employment situation is unavailable, this is 
undoubtedly correlated with the local unemployment rate, which is available. 
 Modeling voluntary (strategic) default is complicated by several factors.  As Guiso, et 
al (forthcoming) point out, strategic defaulters have every incentive to appear as though they 
are facing a liquidity constraint.  If there were no costs associated with default, a borrower 
would simply walk away if and when the value of the house falls below the outstanding 
mortgage balance (became an upside down or underwater loan).  With no costs such an a 
damaged credit score to contend with, a borrower could simply walk away from one house 
and immediately purchase another, substantially similar house.  But as previous researchers 
have pointed out (Van Order, 2007, Bajari, et al, 2008, Guiso, et al, forthcoming), borrowers 
do not default in this “ruthless” manner. 
 Because of the substantial costs associated with default (damaged credit score, 
moving, etc.), a borrower’s default option must be significantly in the money before a 
voluntary (strategic) default is initiated.  While we cannot observe perfectly whether a default 
is strategic, we can observe factors that affect the moneyness of this option.  The current 
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LTV (or % underwater) has been cited as an important factor affecting borrowers’ decisions 
(Guiso, et al, forthcoming, Foote, et al, 2008).  The current LTV is determined by the original 
LTV, the level of home price appreciation (HPA), and the extent of mortgage principal 
paydown. 
 The predicted effect of the FICO score on this decision is not clear.  High FICO 
borrowers have more to lose if their credit scores are ruined for a period of time, and a high 
FICO score in some sense is a measure of “responsibleness” in paying back one’s debt.  
Continuing to make payments on an underwater mortgage is generally viewed as a 
responsible thing to do (Guiso, et al, forthcoming, White, 2010), so high FICO borrowers 
may be more likely to stick with an underwater mortgage out of principal.  On the other 
hand, high FICO borrowers are generally viewed as more financially sophisticated.  These 
borrowers are likely best prepared to deal with a situation where they no longer have access 
to credit if they default on their mortgages.  And this heightened financial sophistication may 
induce these borrowers to exercise their default options in a more optimal manner. 
 The attachment of a borrower to the mortgaged property is likely greater when the 
house is owner occupied (versus an investment property).  For borrowers who do not live in 
the mortgaged property, the costs associated with moving do not enter into the strategic 
default decision.  So we would expect owner occupiers to require a greater inducement in 
order to elect strategic default.  Also for real estate investors, the real estate purchase is a 
business (versus emotional or personal) transaction, and these borrowers are likely less 
influenced by social and moral considerations.  It also seems safe to assume that purchasers 
of investment properties are more financially sophisticated than traditional homebuyers. 
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 To exploit the important differences between owner occupied and investment 
properties, we will run our empirical tests on these two groups separately.  One important 
caveat is necessary when dealing with this occupancy classification.  Investors have financial 
incentive to indicate that they are owner occupiers.  Loans for primary residence properties 
are easier to obtain, and lower mortgage rates are available for these properties.  So 
undoubtedly some of the loans that we classify as owner occupied are actually investment 
properties.  But importantly, there is little doubt that loans classified as investment properties 
are indeed investment properties.  Owner occupiers have no incentive to indicate that they 
are investors. 
 Perhaps the greatest economic consideration affecting the strategic default decision is 
the amount of current equity a borrower has in a house.  Current equity is defined as the 
current market value of a home minus the current loan balance.  A borrower with positive or 
only slightly negative current equity has essentially zero financial incentive to walk away 
from a mortgage.  But borrowers who owe hundreds of thousands of dollars more than their 
homes are worth have tremendous financial incentive to walk away.  Also borrowers with 
significant housing equity who encounter a liquidity shortfall can simply sell their homes and 
use the extracted housing equity to address their liquidity situations. 
 If, as other research has suggested (Guiso, et al, forthcoming, White, 2010), non-
economic factors such as moral and social considerations play an important role in the 
default decision, then these factors should also prove empirically significant.  Using survey 
data, Guiso, et al (forthcoming) find that African Americans and Hispanics are more 
accepting of strategic default.  If the attitudes of one’s neighbors regarding strategic default 
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are important considerations for a borrower, then we would expect ceteris paribus, higher 
levels of default in areas with higher percentages of African Americans and Hispanics. 
 Previous researchers have also found that the level of religious adherence of one’s 
community has a significant impact on economic decision making.  Dyreng, Mayew, and 
Williams (2010) find that firms headquartered in areas with higher levels of religious 
adherence have lower risk of fraudulent accounting, are less likely to restate financial 
statements, and are less likely to engage in tax avoidance. 
 Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2010) examine the relationship between religion and 
unethical corporate executive behavior.  These researchers find that firms located in more 
religious areas are less likely to be the target of class action securities lawsuits, to manipulate 
earnings through the use of accruals, and to backdate options.  Hilary and Hui (2009) find 
that the local level of religiosity impacts corporate risk taking.  Firms located in areas with 
higher levels of religious adherence exhibit lower levels of risk exposure (variance in equity 
returns and ROA). 
Glaeser and Redlick (2008) note that social capital increases area stability and 
promotes community investment.  Social capital is increased through group membership but 
is decreased through migration.  In addition to church involvement (religious adherence), 
unionization is another form of group membership that impacts social capital.  We assess the 
effects of both public and private unionization rates on the mortgage default decision.   
 As Schelling (2006) notes, behavioral influence often depends on how many people 
are behaving a certain way.  This phenomenon of critical mass may be relevant as 
homeowners make decisions related to mortgage default.  Schelling suggests that morality 
likely works this way.  Since Guiso, et al (forthcoming) find that 82% of respondents believe 
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it is morally wrong to walk away from a mortgage that you can afford to pay (strategically 
default), for at least some borrowers, defaulting is a moral decision. 
 As Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) demonstrate using two-period (t = 1, 2), two 
state model, a borrower will default when 
(1) HV1  – 
MV1  ≡ (rent1 – mpay1) + r1
1 · [
4
3 ( GP2  – M2)] + stigmai < 0  
where HV1  is the benefit of staying in the home in period t = 1, 
MV1  is the cost of the 
mortgage, rent1 is the value that the borrower receives from the home in the first period, 
mpay1 is the first period mortgage payment, r is the discount rate, GP2  is the price of the 
house in the second period in the good state, M2 is the remaining mortgage balance in the 
second period, and stigmai is a catch-all term representing the other costs of foreclosure such 
as moving costs, default penalties (i.e. impaired credit score), sentimental attachment to the 
home, and the presence of moral qualms associated with defaulting on one’s debts.  The price 
of the house in the second period in the bad state, BP2 , is assumed to be less than M2, so it 
does not enter the borrower’s decision rule.  If GP2  is less than M2, the borrower will default 
if rent1 + stigmai < mpay1. 
Clearly a borrower’s beliefs regarding likely values of GP2  and 
BP2  are an important part of 
the default decision rule.  Borrowers who believe BP2  > M2 have no economic reason to 
voluntarily default, while borrowers who believe GP2  < M2 will often deem default an 
attractive option.  The extent that borrowers are underwater in their mortgages is an 
important factor to include in default modeling. 
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In the model presented in equation (1), all non-economic considerations and some economic 
factors (moving costs, damaged credit score, etc.) are lumped into the stigmai term.  This 
study will explicitly break out the components of stigma and compare the effects of these 
components with those of the strictly economic considerations entering the default decision.  
The survey data contained in Guiso, et al (forthcoming) indicate that 82% of respondents 
believe that it is morally wrong to strategically default (walk away when you can afford to 
pay).  Previous researchers have found that individuals living in areas with higher levels of 
religious adherence exhibit more ethical behavior.  So if the moral, ethical, and social 
considerations are impacting homeowners’ foreclosure decisions in meaningful ways, then 
we would expect to see indications of this in actual homeowner decisions.  This is the first 
study to use actual mortgage outcomes to address the magnitudes of the effects on the default 
decision of the social and moral components of stigmai. 
Considering the two broad reasons for mortgage default (facing a liquidity shortfall or 
willingly exercising the default option (strategic default)) is helpful in formulating our 
empirical strategy.  Importantly, borrowers who have positive or only slightly negative 
current housing equity have no economic reason to strategically default.  Defaults for these 
borrowers can be reasonably assumed to have been caused by liquidity shortfalls.  For these 
involuntary defaulters, social and moral factors have little, if any, bearing on the default 
decision.  But for borrowers who are significantly underwater in their mortgage loan, 
strategically defaulting may be an attractive option.  For these borrowers who are consciously 
deciding to default, social and moral factors likely play an important role in the decision 
process.  This classification of borrowers along the dimension of current housing equity 
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suggests that important interactions exist between the social/moral factors and the financial 
incentive to strategically default. 
Our empirical strategy is broadly consistent with LaCour-Little and Yang (2010).  We will 
first identify a parsimonious model that captures the important determinants of mortgage 
default.  Once this model has been identified utilizing only economic considerations, 
social/moral factors will be added.  To test the robustness of our findings, we will utilize 
subsamples and additional control variables that are not included in the base model. 
Our empirical tests will primarily utilize the logit regression specifications presented below 
in (2), (3), and (4).  In each model, pi is the probability of a borrower being in some stage of 
foreclosure or REO. 
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 In the models above, set U contains variables informing the level of current housing 
equity of a borrower (Original LTV, Home Price Appreciation), set V contains control 
variables also affecting the probability of mortgage default, set W contains variables related 
to social and moral factors, and set Y contains interaction terms between the elements of set 
U and the elements of set W. 
 Table 4 lists the variables contained in sets U, V, W, and Y for our base model as 
well as the expected effect of each variable on the probability of a loan being in some stage 
of foreclosure or REO.  The expected effects of the variables in set U are unambiguous.  
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Together these variables determine a borrower’s current level of housing equity.  Borrowers 
with sufficiently high levels of housing equity will essentially never enter the foreclosure 
process.  Even if these borrowers encounter a liquidity crunch, they can simply sell their 
homes and use the proceeds to address their financial difficulties.  But borrowers with very 
little or negative housing equity face a much different situation.  When these borrowers 
confront a liquidity crunch, they have no equity to extract, and mortgage delinquency is often 
the result.  Even underwater borrowers not facing a liquidity shortfall may find strategic 
default attractive, and the result of this is also delinquency followed by foreclosure. 
 Set V contains both borrower-specific and local economic factors that impact the 
likelihood of delinquency and default.  Cash out refi borrowers are increasing their household 
leverage, and this would generally be expected to increase the likelihood of default.  A 
refinancing where no cash is taken out does not affect household leverage, but presumably 
the monthly payment is reduced (due to a decrease in the interest rate).  This should improve 
a borrower’s financial position.  Refi borrowers have lived in their homes longer than 
purchase borrowers, and this would also be expected to lower the risk of default (greater 
emotional attachment to home). 
 Affordability mortgage products (ARM, IO, NegAm) are all indicative of borrowers 
stretching their financial resources, and these loan characteristics are expected to increase 
default risk.  Borrowers with an ARM that has already reset are more likely to encounter a 
liquidity shortfall.  As other researchers have found (LaCour-Little, Yang, 2010), borrowers 
providing less than full documentation are more likely to default.  When a loan is modified, 
the borrower essentially gets to restart the delinquency process.  So even if the borrower 
becomes delinquent immediately following a modification, some time will pass before the 
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foreclosure process is initiated.  Put another way, assume two borrowers are equally 
delinquent.  One of the borrowers is modified, but the other is not.  If neither borrower ever 
makes another payment, the modified borrower will enter the foreclosure process later. 
 FICO score is widely accepted as a reliable predictor of borrower risk, and higher 
FICO borrowers are less likely to default.  But as was discussed previously, high FICO 
borrowers are likely also more financially sophisticated.  This sophistication may lead these 
borrowers to exercise their default options in a more efficient manner.  As more time passes 
since origination, two things generally happen that reduce the likelihood of default.  First, at 
least for amortizing loans, borrowers pay down part of their mortgage balances and their 
housing equity increases.  Second, their emotional attachment to the homes increases. 
 Borrowers living in more economically depressed areas are more likely to encounter 
liquidity constraints, which often lead to involuntary mortgage defaults.  To capture the 
deterioration in the local economy, we use the percent change in the unemployment rate 
since mortgage origination (at the county level). 
Set W contains the social and moral factors that we will test.  African American population 
fraction, Hispanic population fraction, and the level of religious adherence inform the general 
level of permissiveness toward strategic mortgage default in a local area.  The level of 
religious adherence, private unionization rate, and public unionization rate serve as proxies 
for group membership, which informs the local level of social capital discussed in Glaeser 
and Redlick (2008).   
 Set Y contains interactions between the variables in Set U and those in Set W.  When 
the variables in Set U indicate borrowers with positive housing equity (low LTV, high HPA), 
we expect the social and moral variables of Set W to have a negligible effect.  If these 
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borrowers default, it is an involuntary response to a liquidity shortfall.  But for borrowers 
with negative levels of housing equity (high LTV, low HPA), we expect the opposite effect.  
For the borrowers who are more likely to be strategically defaulting, we expect the effects of 
the social and moral factors to be more pronounced.   
4. Data 
 Loan-level data on individual residential mortgages are available for a national 
sample of private-label securitizations, known as Columbia collateral files.  This data is 
available through Wells Fargo’s CTS Link (http://www.ctslink.com).  Data is available 
through CTS Link for a variety of investment vehicles administered by the Corporate Trust 
Services group of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo serves as the trustee).  Specifically, 
to access this data we first logged into the CTS Link website.  Then we selected “All 
Securities” on the left hand side.  Then we scrolled down in the alphabetical list to “Other 
Reports and Files” and selected “Shelf Documents.”  From the Important Data section within 
Shelf Data, all deals can be downloaded by year.  These datafiles contain the loan-level data 
utilized in this study.  The data utilized in this study was obtained in October 2009, and the 
loan information is as of September 30, 2009. 
To capture the dynamics of the current situation facing homeowners, for this study we use 
data for 2005, 2006, and 2007 originations.  We have chosen to focus on these three years for 
a few reasons.  First, these three years combined contain the overwhelming majority of the 
available observations (over 79%).  Each of the three years is well represented containing 
438,528, 723,414, and 226,628 home loans for 2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively (1,388,570 
total).  Also it is widely accepted that residential mortgage underwriting deteriorated 
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significantly from 2005 to 2006 (Goodman, et al, 2008 for example).  So our sample contains 
loans originated both before and after this deterioration.   
 This dataset contains loans from all 50 states and Washington DC.  As documented in 
White (2009), this dataset contains loans from seven of the top ten subprime mortgage 
originators and six of the top fifteen subprime servicers.   The loans in this sample would 
generally be classified by mortgage investors as subprime (weak credit profile) or Alt-A 
(limited documentation).  As noted by Ding and Quercia (2009), about 90% of the loans in 
this dataset have at least one risk characteristic common in the subprime sector.  These risk 
characteristics include 1) borrower FICO score less than 620; 2) interest only mortgage; 3) 
negative amortization mortgage; 4) limited or no documentation (also indicative of Alt-A 
loans); and 5) original loan-to-value ratios higher than 90 percent.   
 Cleaning the loan-level dataset consisted of several steps.  First observations with 
clearly defective data fields were omitted.  Examples of these defects include original loan 
balances less than zero, original loan to value ratios (LTVs) less than zero, FICO scores less 
than 350, and FICO scores above 850. 
 To reduce the influence of mis-keyed data, we eliminated observations with extreme 
values of important data fields.  Loans with original LTVs above 100% (99th percentile) or 
below 34.8% (1st percentile) are exluded.  Loans paid off in full (only 5 loans) are excluded.  
When current loan balances are compared to original loan balances, certain peculiarities are 
observed for a small fraction of the loans.  The most common issue is that the current balance 
is substantially larger than the original balance (almost 8 times in some cases).  To remedy 
this, we exclude loans where the current balance is more than 13.3% larger (99th percentile) 
than the original loan.  We acknowledge the possibility that current balances can grow over 
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time, so we do not exclude all loans in this category.  Negative amortization and late fees are 
examples of legitimate catalysts for increased loan balances. 
 To avoid the potentially contaminating effects of homeowner associations in the 
delinquency/foreclosure process, loans tied to condominiums and loans tied to properties in 
planned urban developments are not included in our primary tests.  Also any loan that 
appears to be commercial in nature is excluded.  For the majority of our empirical tests, only 
loans where the Property Type variable is keyed “Single Family” or “Single Family-
Detached” are included. 
 Only loans where the Ownership variable is keyed “Investor” or “Primary Residence” 
are included.  We recognize that important differences exist between investment and owner-
occupied properties, so we run our tests separately for these two ownership types.  We utilize 
important differences between these borrower types to make inferences regarding 
homeowner behavior.  We include only loans where the Loan Purpose variable is keyed 
“Refi/Cash Out,” “Primary Purchase,” or “Refi/No Cash Out.”  After employing each of 
these screens with the dataset, 826,298 observations remain. 
An important classification in our empirical tests is whether or not a borrower is in some 
stage of the foreclosure process.  The Delinquent Code variable in the dataset indicates the 
action (if any) that is currently being taken by the mortgage servicer.  We classify borrowers 
where this variable is keyed “Decision for Foreclosure,” “REO,” “3rd Party Foreclosure,” or 
“Foreclosure with Claim” as those in some stage of foreclosure.  We classify borrowers 
where this variable is keyed “No Action” as those not in foreclosure.  Borrowers suffering 
other credit events such as bankruptcy are excluded from the sample. 
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One drawback of the dataset is that it is not clear when the action indicated by the Delinquent 
Code variable was initiated.  We do not know how long a borrower has been in the 
foreclosure process for example.  We know only that the borrower became sufficiently 
delinquent at some point after the loan was originated to enter the foreclosure process, but the 
property has not yet been liquidated.  After a property has been liquidated, the loan is 
removed from the dataset (and a Loss Severity is determined for investors in the mortgage 
securitization Trust).  
We obtain monthly unemployment data by county from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local 
Area Unemployment Statistics.  The county unemployment data is mapped to the zip code 
associated with each loan using the georef.zcta_master Dataset from the Office of Social and 
Economic Data Analysis at the University of Missouri.  This dataset provides the primary 
county associated with every zip code in the United States.  For use as a control variable, we 
also obtain racial unemployment rate data by year and by state from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics.  
 We obtain quarterly home price appreciation data from the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).  We map the OFHEO metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
definitions to counties using data from Moody’s Economy.com and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).  If a property in our dataset is not part of an MSA, we use 
home price data at the state level from OFHEO.   
Annual per capita personal income data is obtained at the county level from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
 Assessing the housing equity situation of the borrowers involved several steps.  The 
original appraisal value in the mortgage dataset is not reliable (mostly missing), so we use the 
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Original Loan Balance divided by the Original Loan to Value ratio (LTV) to determine the 
original value of each home.  We use the home price appreciation as described above to 
determine the current value of each home.  The current equity of each homeowner is simply 
the current value of his or her home minus the current loan balance, which is in the mortgage 
dataset.  The current equity fraction is the current equity divided by the current value of the 
home.  
We obtain data on religiosity from the American Religion Data Archive (ARDA).  This 
database contains religious information for every county in the US for the years 1971, 1980, 
1990, and 2000.  Among other things, this database contains the number of religious 
adherents by US county.  The ARDA defines adherents as “all members, including full 
members, their children and the estimated number of other regular participants who are not 
considered as communicant, confirmed or full members, for example, the ‘baptized’, ‘those 
not confirmed’, ‘those not eligible for communion’ and the like.”  As in Hilary and Hui 
(2009), Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2010), and Dyreng, Mayew, and Williams (2010), 
one of our primary variables of interest is the degree of religiosity (REL) in the county where 
each property in our sample is located.  Consistent with prior research, we define REL as the 
number of religious adherents in 2000 from ARDA divided by the total county population in 
2000 from the US Census.  This level of religiosity from 1990 to 2000 is quite stable, so 
using the 2000 data (most recent available) is reasonable.  Conceptually, we are trying to 
capture the social and moral considerations that affect homeowners’ propensity to default on 
their mortgages as discussed in Guiso, et al (forthcoming) and White (2010).  When a greater 
fraction of the population in a given county is religious, religious social norms exert greater 
influence on homeowners in that county. 
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 We obtain annual population data by race for each US county from the Population 
Division, US Census Bureau.  We obtain annual union membership data by MSA (state if 
MSA not available) from the website Unionstats.com.  The information available from 
Unionstats.com is provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson.  A full description of 
this union database is provided in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).   
Tables 2 and 3 show correlation tables for important variables in this study for primary 
residence and investment properties, respectively.  The religious, unionization, and racial 
variables are correlated with key economic variables (most notably home price appreciation 
and unemployment rate), so controlling for the economic conditions facing the homeowners 
in the sample will be important for the multivariate analysis.  For example, the Hispanic 
population fraction is positively correlated with increases in unemployment but negatively 
correlated with home price appreciation. 
 In order to further account for differences among borrowers, a number of additional 
variables are included in robustness tests.  A dummy variable is included indicating if a 
borrower’s state is a non-recourse state, where lenders cannot pursue other borrower assets in 
the event of a home mortgage default (source: Bloomberg).   
 Both the homeownership rate and homeownership rate change are obtained from the 
Housing Vacancy Survey, Bureau of the Census at the MSA level (state if MSA not 
available).  The change in homeowner vacancy and rental vacancy at the MSA level (state if 
M SA not available) are also obtained from the Housing Vacancy Survey, Bureau of the 
Census.  The percent of the adults in each county with a college degree has also been 
obtained from the Census of Population, Bureau of the Census. 
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 To control for inflation that may be relevant for homeowners, three measures of 
inflation have been obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. Department of 
Labor.  All three measures are available at the MSA level.  If a homeowner in the sample 
does not live in one of the available MSA’s, then the data for the region (Northeast, Midwest, 
South, and West) is used.  Particularly relevant for this study are the Owners’ equivalent rent 
of primary residence (OER) and Rent of primary residence (Rent).  The overall level of 
inflation (CPI change) is also included. 
5. Results 
 This study broadly addresses two questions.  First, do moral and social considerations 
enter a borrower’s decision to default on his or her mortgage as Guiso, et al (forthcoming) 
and White (2010) suggest?  Second, if so, how do the magnitudes of the effects of these non-
economic factors compare to those of strictly economic considerations? 
  Tables 5 and 6 each present the results of seven logistic regressions for primary 
residence properties and investment properties, respectively.  The dependent variable in each 
regression is set to one if a property is currently in foreclosure or REO, and zero otherwise.  
To account for the myriad differences among the states (legal requirements within 
foreclosure process, zoning, etc.), state fixed effects are included in all of the regressions.  
Also as Goodman, et al (2008) documented, underwriting rigor deteriorated dramatically 
from 2005 to 2006 originations.  To account for these potentially unobservable differences 
among the origination years, year fixed effects are also included in all of the specifications.  
Also, servicer fixed effects are included to account for differences among mortgage servicers 
(propensity to modify, speed of foreclosure process, etc.). 
5.1. Results: Set U (Variables Informing Current Housing Equity) 
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 The regression coefficients for the variables in Set U (Original LTV, Home Price 
Appreciation) are as expected for both occupancy types.  Together these variables largely 
determine a borrower’s level of current housing equity.  Interestingly, the economic 
significance is larger in each regression for investors than it is for owner occupiers.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, financial considerations appear to be more dominant factors for investors 
than for owner occupiers. 
5.2. Results: Set V (Additional Economic Factors) 
 The variables in Set V (borrower-specific and local economic factors that impact the 
likelihood of delinquency and default) are largely as expected, with a few notable exceptions.  
Interestingly, cash-out refi borrowers are less likely than both purchasers and rate/term refi 
borrowers to enter foreclosure or REO.  Even if these borrowers are underwater in their 
current mortgages, they may be well above water when their current loan balance is 
compared to the original purchase price.  And these borrowers have had more time to 
develop an emotional attachment to their homes than purchasers have.  This emotional 
attachment factor does not seem to be relevant for investment properties, as refi loans are 
actually more likely to be in foreclosure or REO.  This is as expected since investors do not 
actually live in the mortgaged homes. 
 Borrowers selecting affordability mortgage products (ARM, IO, NegAm) are 
significantly more likely to enter foreclosure or REO than traditional fixed rate borrowers.  
The only exception to this is NegAm borrowers, but as was discussed previously, NegAm 
loans are also generally adjustable rate or interest only (or both).  As expected, borrowers 
with adjustable rates that have already reset are more likely to be in default.  Borrowers who 
elected to provide full documentation are much less likely to enter default, and resetting a 
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borrower back to current status (modifying a loan) at least delays borrower default.  
Borrowers with higher FICO scores are less likely to default, and borrowers living in areas 
with greater increases in the unemployment rate are more likely to enter foreclosure or REO.  
While not economically significant, older loans are slightly more likely to be in default. 
 Interesting differences exist in the coefficients of the variables in set V for investment 
properties versus primary residence properties.  The loan type that a borrower selected 
(ARM, IO, NegAm, fixed rate) is still statistically and economically significant for investors, 
but the magnitudes of the marginal effects are smaller for investment properties.  But the 
effects of a previous rate reset, whether or not full documentation was provided, whether or 
not the loan has been modified, FICO score, and the percent change in local unemployment 
all have similar effects on the likelihood of foreclosure or REO for investors and owner 
occupiers. 
5.3. Results: Set W (Social and Moral Factors) 
  The regression coefficients for the variables in Set W (social and moral factors) are 
generally statistically significant but often not economically significant.  When all of our 
social and moral factors are included, individuals living in areas with higher levels of 
religious adherence are slightly less likely to enter foreclosure or REO.  The increased level 
of permissiveness toward strategic default does make mortgage default appreciably more 
likely in communities where Hispanics make up a larger fraction of the population.  But 
contrary to the survey results of Guiso, et al (forthcoming), a higher population fraction of 
African Americans seems to slightly discourage mortgage default.  And default is slightly 
more likely in areas with higher levels of unionization. 
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 The results for African American population fraction are consistent with Zhu (2010), 
who finds that African Americans are less likely to enter mortgage default.  But this author 
also finds that Hispanic borrowers are less likely to default, which is not consistent with our 
findings.  But importantly, the results are not exactly comparable.  We examine the effects of 
the community social and moral norms captured by community racial composition.  We do 
not examine the effects of an individual borrower’s race.  Also Zhu (2010) does not find a 
statistically significant relationship between whether a borrower lives in a minority 
community (less than 50% non-Hispanic white) and the likelihood of mortgage default.  Zhu 
(2010) does not utilize the population fractions of African Americans or Hispanics 
specifically in empirical testing, which is the approach we take. 
 Interestingly, the social and moral factors play a much smaller role in the default 
decision for investors.  Once all of the social and moral factors are included, only the 
Hispanic population fraction is statistically significant.  And even for this variable, the 
economic significance is negligible for investors.  So perhaps not surprisingly, investors are 
more influenced by current housing equity (LTV, HPA) but significantly less affected by 
social and moral considerations. 
 But even for primary residence borrowers, the magnitudes of the effects of the social 
and moral factors presented in Table 5 are much smaller than those of the economic factors.  
Without accounting for the interaction between the social/moral factors and the level of 
current housing equity, the social/moral factors have an ancillary impact on mortgage 
borrowers’ default decision when compared to strictly economic considerations.   
5.4. Results: Set Y (Interactions Between Set U and Set W) 
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 Tables 7 and 8 show five logistic regressions where interaction terms between the 
variables in Set U and those in Set W are included.  These interaction terms enable us to see 
how the effects of the social and moral factors depend on a borrower’s current level of 
housing equity. 
 As expected, the negative effect of religious adherence on the likelihood of 
foreclosure is stronger for borrowers with less housing equity (higher LTV).  These 
borrowers are more likely to be consciously deciding to walk away, and the social and moral 
factors are more impactful.  The same is true of the effect of the permissive attitude of the 
Hispanic community toward strategic default (Guiso, et al, forthcoming).  For borrowers with 
lower levels of housing equity, the positive effect of Hispanic population fraction is 
amplified.  Both the LTV and HPA interactions are statistically significant, and the sign is as 
expected.  Again the interaction coefficients for African American population fraction are not 
consistent with the survey results of Guiso, et al (forthcoming). 
 The private unionization interaction terms are as we expected.  The higher social 
capital in communities with a more pronounced private union presence does deter would-be 
strategic defaulters.  But the effect is the opposite of what we expected for public 
unionization. 
 The interaction terms are fairly similar for investment properties (Table 8), but 
important differences should be noted.  The social and moral factor base coefficients (not the 
interaction terms) are generally more significant for primary residence properties.  The 
interaction effects of religious adherence, African American population fraction, and the 
private unionization rate are similar for investors and owner occupiers.  The economic 
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significance of the Hispanic population fraction interaction terms is about half as large for 
investment properties as it is for primary residences. 
 Once we account for the interaction between the social/moral factors and the level of 
current housing equity, the magnitudes of the combined effects are as large as or larger than 
the effects of many of the strictly economic considerations (FICO score for example).  
 Another way to assess the impact of housing equity on the effects of the social and 
moral factors is by splitting the sample.  Tables 9 and 10 show the results of our base logistic 
regression model for borrowers in CA, FL, AZ, and NV versus other states, respectively.  On 
average, the sample homes in CA, FL, AZ, and NV have dropped 31% in value since loan 
origination, but the homes in the remaining states have dropped only 3% on average.  So the 
borrowers in CA, FL, AZ, and NV have much less current housing equity, and many of these 
borrowers may deem strategic default an attractive option.  But for the borrowers in the 
remaining states, mortgage default generally only results from a liquidity crunch (job loss, 
medical bill, etc.). 
 For the sand state borrowers, current housing equity (LTV, HPA) has an effect that is 
almost 50% larger for investors versus owner occupiers.  Also, the impact of the social and 
moral factors is generally less for investment properties than for primary residences, most 
notably the effect of the Hispanic population fraction. 
 For the borrowers in the states other than CA, FL, AZ, and NV who are facing a 
much less dire situation in terms of home equity, the economic significance of the social and 
moral factors is fairly inconsequential for both primary residences and investment properties.  
This is also as we would have expected.  These borrowers generally are not far enough 
underwater to consider strategically defaulting, and when default is only driven by a liquidity 
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shortfall, social and moral considerations are not important factors.  But even in these states, 
current housing equity is a much more important consideration for investors than for owner 
occupiers. 
6. Conclusions 
We find that the social norms and moral barometers captured by local religious adherence, 
unionization rates, and racial composition impact a borrower’s willingness to pay back his or 
her mortgage.  Homeowners living in more religious areas are slightly less likely to enter 
mortgage foreclosure.  Consistent with Guiso, et al, forthcoming, who find that Hispanics are 
more accepting of strategic default, we find that individuals living in communities with 
higher fractions of Hispanic residents are more likely to enter foreclosure.   
Importantly, the effects of moral and social factors are different for borrowers defaulting 
involuntarily due to liquidity constraints and borrowers likely defaulting voluntarily due to 
significant negative housing equity.  If the interaction between the level of housing equity 
and the social/moral factors is not accounted for, the effect of the social and moral factors is 
quite small relative to the effects of purely economic factors.  But for borrowers with lower 
levels of current housing equity (high original LTV and/or low home price appreciation), a 
lower level of religious adherence, a higher Hispanic population fraction, and a lower rate of 
private unionization are all associated with a higher likelihood that a borrower will be in 
foreclosure.  And the magnitudes of the effects of moving the social factors and the level of 
housing equity simultaneously are as large as or larger than many of the economic factors 
(FICO score for example). 
Our results are not consistent with the idea that borrowers living in neighborhoods with a 
higher proportion of minority borrowers are more likely to default on their mortgages.  If 
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anything, borrowers in more African American areas are less likely to become seriously 
delinquent. 
 So perhaps surprisingly, non-market factors such as moral and social considerations 
have a meaningful impact on homeowners as they consider defaulting on their home loans.  
By verifying this phenomenon using data containing actual consumer behavior, we have 
hopefully enhanced our understanding of the decision process of borrowers.  As an 
interesting area for further research, researchers could examine if the effectiveness of loan 
modification programs depends in any way on the level of local religious adherence, union 
membership, or racial composition.  It likely would prove fruitful to examine if borrowers’ 
attitudes toward the modified contracts are similar to their attitudes toward the original 
contracts. 
 While this study has shed some light on the attitudes of homeowners as they 
contemplate their mortgage options, many questions still remain.  While we have obtained 
data related to religious adherence, union membership, and racial composition at the local 
level, perhaps the religious beliefs, union membership, or race of the individual homeowners 
is important.  This data would be difficult to obtain, but it could prove insightful.  It would be 
interesting to study the dynamics of the social norms captured by the racial composition of 
one’s community when combined with the race of the individual borrowers.  While this study 
has focused almost exclusively on subprime borrowers, an interesting extension would be to 
examine the effects of these social and moral considerations on the behavior of prime 
borrowers. 
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Table 1, Panel A: Summary Statistics, Primary Residence Properties  
 
Variable N Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Foreclosure, REO (0,1) 735,742 0.19 0.39 0 1
Cash Out Refi (0,1) 735,742 0.48 0.50 0 1
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1) 735,742 0.14 0.35 0 1
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1) 735,742 0.64 0.48 0 1
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1) 735,742 0.30 0.46 0 1
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1) 735,742 0.12 0.32 0 1
Previous Rate Reset (0,1) 735,742 0.17 0.38 0 1
Full Documentation (0,1) 714,752 0.57 0.50 0 1
Modified Loan (0,1) 735,742 0.01 0.08 0 1
FICO Score 725,795 661.76 71.77 386 850
Months Since Origination 735,742 40.38 7.72 21 56
Original LTV 735,742 78.27 11.24 34.70 100.00
Home Price Appreciation 735,742 -0.15 0.17 -0.62 0.65
% Change Unemployment 735,311 1.25 0.60 -0.72 5.72
REL (Religious Adherence) 735,507 0.48 0.12 0.02 1.00
Hispanic Fraction 735,737 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.97
African American Fraction 735,737 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.86
White Fraction 735,737 0.79 0.13 0.13 1.00
Union Memb. Private (%) 735,742 7.54 4.22 0.00 33.50
Union Memb. Public (%) 735,742 42.15 19.81 0.00 93.30
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Table 1, Panel B: Summary Statistics, Investment Properties 
 
Variable N Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Foreclosure, REO (0,1) 90,556 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Cash Out Refi (0,1) 90,556 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1) 90,556 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1) 90,556 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1) 90,556 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1) 90,556 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Previous Rate Reset (0,1) 90,556 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Full Documentation (0,1) 88,368 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Modified Loan (0,1) 90,556 0.00 0.04 0 1 
FICO Score 89,549 700.93 58.93 431 850 
Months Since Origination 90,556 40.57 7.88 21 56 
Original LTV 90,556 76.43 11.12 34.70 100.00 
Home Price Appreciation 90,556 -0.12 0.17 -0.62 0.65 
% Change Unemployment 90,530 1.23 0.65 -0.73 5.00 
REL (Religious Adherence) 90,536 0.46 0.11 0.02 0.99 
Hispanic Fraction 90,555 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.97 
African American Fraction 90,555 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.82 
White Fraction 90,555 0.77 0.15 0.16 0.99 
Union Memb. Private (%) 90,556 6.59 4.28 0.00 33.50 
Union Memb. Public (%) 90,556 36.46 19.82 0.00 93.30 
 
T
able 2: C
orrelation T
able, Prim
ary R
esidence Properties 
   
Forecl 
R
E
O
 
FIC
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H
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%
C
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U
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A
dh 
H
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A
fr A
m
 
W
hite 
U
nion 
Priv 
U
nion 
Pub 
Forecl R
EO
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIC
O
 
-0.12*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
PA
 
-0.16*** 
-0.16*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%
C
hange U
nem
pl 
0.14*** 
0.07*** 
-0.59*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
EL A
dh 
-0.03*** 
-0.06*** 
0.28*** 
-0.22*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ispanic 
0.07*** 
0.12*** 
-0.48*** 
0.19*** 
0.04*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
A
fr A
m
 
0.00*** 
-0.13*** 
0.15*** 
-0.07*** 
-0.02*** 
-0.16*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
W
hite 
0.00 
-0.02*** 
0.02*** 
-0.02*** 
0.08*** 
-0.01*** 
-0.83*** 
1.00 
 
 
U
nion Priv 
0.01*** 
0.10*** 
-0.22*** 
-0.09*** 
0.10*** 
0.04*** 
-0.19*** 
-0.01*** 
1.00 
 
U
nion Pub 
0.04*** 
0.13*** 
-0.31*** 
-0.02*** 
0.18*** 
0.14*** 
-0.29*** 
0.08*** 
0.78*** 
1.00 
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T
able 3: C
orrelation T
able, Investm
ent Properties 
   
Forecl 
R
E
O
 
FIC
O
 
H
PA
 
%
C
hange 
U
nem
pl 
R
EL 
A
dh 
H
ispanic 
A
fr A
m
 
W
hite 
U
nion 
Priv 
U
nion 
Pub 
Forecl R
EO
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIC
O
 
-0.16*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
PA
 
-0.18*** 
-0.05*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%
C
hange U
nem
pl 
0.17*** 
0.04*** 
-0.58*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
EL A
dh 
-0.03*** 
-0.07*** 
0.29*** 
-0.23*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ispanic 
0.02*** 
0.04*** 
-0.41*** 
0.08*** 
0.08*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
A
fr A
m
 
0.02*** 
-0.14*** 
0.21*** 
-0.12*** 
0.02*** 
-0.27*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
W
hite 
-0.01* 
0.10*** 
-0.10*** 
0.09*** 
0.02*** 
0.15*** 
-0.91*** 
1.00 
 
 
U
nion Priv 
0.00 
-0.01*** 
-0.25*** 
-0.14*** 
0.02*** 
0.07*** 
-0.15*** 
0.00 
1.00 
 
U
nion Pub 
0.04*** 
-0.01 
-0.37*** 
-0.04*** 
0.05*** 
0.16*** 
-0.28*** 
0.12*** 
0.78*** 
1.00 
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Table 4: Expected Effects of Factors Informing Mortgage Delinquency/Default 
  Expected Effect on Prob(Foreclosure,REO) 
Set U   
Original LTV  + 
Home Price Appreciation  (HPA)  - 
   
Set V   
Cash Out Refi (0,1)  + 
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1)  - 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1)  + 
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1)  + 
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1)  + 
Previous Rate Reset (0,1)  + 
Full Documentation (0,1)  - 
Modified Loan (0,1)  - 
FICO Score  - 
Months Since Origination  - 
% Change Unemployment  + 
   
Set W   
REL (Religious Adherence)  - 
Hispanic Fraction  + 
African American Fraction  + 
White Fraction  +/- 
Union Memb. Private (%)  - 
Union Memb. Public (%)  - 
   
Set Y   
REL X LTV  - 
REL X HPA  + 
Hispanic Fract. X LTV  + 
Hispanic Fract. X HPA  - 
African Am. X LTV  + 
African Am. X HPA  - 
White X LTV  +/- 
White X HPA  +/- 
Union Priv. X LTV  - 
Union Priv. X HPA  + 
Union Pub. X LTV  - 
Union Pub. X HPA  + 
T
able 5: M
arginal E
ffects of L
ocal and B
orrow
er Specific Factors: Prim
ary R
esidence Properties 
This table contains seven logistic regressions exam
ining the local and borrow
er specific factors influencing m
ortgage delinquency and default.  The 
dependent variable in each of the m
odels is equal to one if the property is currently in foreclosure or R
EO
, and zero otherw
ise.  The reported num
bers 
are the changes in estim
ated probabilities of a property being in foreclosure or R
EO
 for a one standard deviation increase (for continuous variables) or 
the change induced by a change in a dum
m
y variable from
 zero to one, w
ith the rem
aining variables held at their m
eans.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%
, 5%
, and 10%
 respectively.  A
ll specifications include fixed effects for state, origination year, and m
ortgage servicer. 
 C
ash O
ut R
efi (0,1) 
-0.062*** 
-0.062*** 
-0.061*** 
-0.061*** 
-0.061*** 
-0.062*** 
-0.062*** 
R
efi: N
o C
ash O
ut (0,1) 
-0.035*** 
-0.035*** 
-0.033*** 
-0.034*** 
-0.034*** 
-0.034*** 
-0.034*** 
A
djustable R
ate M
ortgage (0,1) 
0.135*** 
0.136*** 
0.135*** 
0.135*** 
0.134*** 
0.135*** 
0.135*** 
Interest O
nly M
ortgage (0,1) 
0.033*** 
0.033*** 
0.033*** 
0.033*** 
0.033*** 
0.033*** 
0.033*** 
N
egative A
m
ortization Perm
itted (0,1) 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
Previous R
ate R
eset (0,1) 
0.021*** 
0.021*** 
0.021*** 
0.021*** 
0.021*** 
0.021*** 
0.021*** 
Full D
ocum
entation (0,1) 
-0.094*** 
-0.094*** 
-0.093*** 
-0.093*** 
-0.093*** 
-0.093*** 
-0.093*** 
M
odified Loan (0,1) 
-0.137*** 
-0.137*** 
-0.136*** 
-0.137*** 
-0.136*** 
-0.137*** 
-0.137*** 
FIC
O
 Score 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
M
onths Since O
rigination 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
0.010*** 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
O
riginal LTV
 
0.050*** 
0.051*** 
0.051*** 
0.051*** 
0.051*** 
0.051*** 
0.051*** 
H
om
e Price A
ppreciation 
-0.049*** 
-0.049*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.046*** 
-0.046*** 
-0.046*** 
%
 C
hange U
nem
ploym
ent 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
0.012*** 
0.012*** 
0.012*** 
0.012*** 
0.012*** 
R
EL (R
eligious A
dherence) 
 
0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
H
ispanic Fraction 
 
 
0.017*** 
0.017*** 
0.018*** 
0.018*** 
0.018*** 
A
frican A
m
erican Fraction 
 
 
 
-0.001 
-0.009*** 
-0.009*** 
-0.009*** 
W
hite Fraction 
 
 
 
 
-0.008*** 
-0.008*** 
-0.008*** 
U
nion M
em
b. Private (%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002*** 
0.002** 
U
nion M
em
b. Public (%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
 
706,222 
705,993 
705,993 
705,993 
705,993 
705,993 
705,993 
3 9  
T
able 6: M
arginal E
ffects of L
ocal and B
orrow
er Specific Factors: Investm
ent Properties 
This table contains seven logistic regressions exam
ining the local and borrow
er specific factors influencing m
ortgage delinquency and default.  The 
dependent variable in each of the m
odels is equal to one if the property is currently in foreclosure or R
EO
, and zero otherw
ise.  The reported num
bers 
are the changes in estim
ated probabilities of a property being in foreclosure or R
EO
 for a one standard deviation increase (for continuous variables) or 
the change induced by a change in a dum
m
y variable from
 zero to one, w
ith the rem
aining variables held at their m
eans.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%
, 5%
, and 10%
 respectively.  A
ll specifications include fixed effects for state, origination year, and m
ortgage servicer. 
 C
ash O
ut R
efi (0,1) 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
R
efi: N
o C
ash O
ut (0,1) 
0.034*** 
0.034*** 
0.034*** 
0.035*** 
0.035*** 
0.035*** 
0.035*** 
A
djustable R
ate M
ortgage (0,1) 
0.085*** 
0.085*** 
0.085*** 
0.085*** 
0.085*** 
0.085*** 
0.085*** 
Interest O
nly M
ortgage (0,1) 
0.023*** 
0.023*** 
0.023*** 
0.023*** 
0.023*** 
0.023*** 
0.023*** 
N
egative A
m
ortization Perm
itted (0,1) 
-0.017*** 
-0.017*** 
-0.017*** 
-0.016*** 
-0.016*** 
-0.016*** 
-0.016*** 
Previous R
ate R
eset (0,1) 
0.019*** 
0.019*** 
0.019*** 
0.019*** 
0.019*** 
0.019*** 
0.019*** 
Full D
ocum
entation (0,1) 
-0.091*** 
-0.091*** 
-0.091*** 
-0.091*** 
-0.091*** 
-0.091*** 
-0.091*** 
M
odified Loan (0,1) 
-0.152*** 
-0.152*** 
-0.152*** 
-0.152*** 
-0.152*** 
-0.152*** 
-0.152*** 
FIC
O
 Score 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
-0.045*** 
M
onths Since O
rigination 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
O
riginal LTV
 
0.083*** 
0.083*** 
0.083*** 
0.083*** 
0.083*** 
0.083*** 
0.083*** 
H
om
e Price A
ppreciation 
-0.060*** 
-0.060*** 
-0.059*** 
-0.058*** 
-0.058*** 
-0.058*** 
-0.058*** 
%
 C
hange U
nem
ploym
ent 
0.006*** 
0.006*** 
0.007*** 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
R
EL (R
eligious A
dherence) 
 
0.001 
-0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
H
ispanic Fraction 
 
 
0.006*** 
0.004** 
0.005** 
0.005** 
0.005** 
A
frican A
m
erican Fraction 
 
 
 
0.012*** 
0.009 
0.009 
0.009 
W
hite Fraction 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
-0.002 
-0.002 
U
nion M
em
b. Private (%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
0.003 
U
nion M
em
b. Public (%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
 
87,492 
87,474 
87,474 
87,474 
87,474 
87,474 
87,474 
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Table 7: Marginal Effects of Local and Borrower Specific Factors: Primary Residence 
Properties, Interactions Included 
This table contains five logistic regressions examining the local and borrower specific factors influencing 
mortgage delinquency and default.  The dependent variable in each of the models is equal to one if the property 
is currently in foreclosure or REO, and zero otherwise.  The reported numbers are the changes in estimated 
probabilities of a property being in foreclosure or REO for a one standard deviation increase (for continuous 
variables) or the change induced by a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, with the remaining 
variables held at their means.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  All 
specifications include fixed effects for state, origination year, and mortgage servicer. 
 
Cash Out Refi (0,1) -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1) -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1) 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
Previous Rate Reset (0,1) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
Full Documentation (0,1) -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
Modified Loan (0,1) -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.137*** 
FICO Score -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
Months Since Origination 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
Original LTV 0.051*** 0.066*** 0.190*** 0.035*** 0.201*** 
Home Price Appreciation  (HPA) -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.056*** 
% Change Unemployment 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
REL (Religious Adherence) -0.002*** 0.020*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.025*** 
Hispanic Fraction 0.018*** 0.018*** -0.046*** 0.018*** -0.044*** 
African American Fraction -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.136*** -0.009*** 0.127*** 
White Fraction -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.120*** -0.008*** 0.118*** 
Union Memb. Private (%) 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.038*** 0.038*** 
Union Memb. Public (%) 0.002* 0.003* 0.003** -0.055*** -0.036*** 
REL X LTV  -0.023***   -0.026*** 
REL X HPA  0.001   0.002 
Hispanic Fract. X LTV   0.075***  0.071*** 
Hispanic Fract. X HPA   -0.008***  -0.009*** 
African Am. X LTV   -0.084***  -0.081*** 
African Am. X HPA   0.001  0.003 
White X LTV   -0.092***  -0.091*** 
White X HPA   0.006  0.016* 
Union Priv. X LTV    -0.026*** -0.027*** 
Union Priv. X HPA    0.008*** 0.009*** 
Union Pub. X LTV    0.076*** 0.045*** 
Union Pub. X HPA    -0.009*** -0.005** 
      
N 705,993 705,993 705,993 705,993 705,993 
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Table 8: Marginal Effects of Local and Borrower Specific Factors: Investment 
Properties, Interactions Included 
This table contains five logistic regressions examining the local and borrower specific factors influencing 
mortgage delinquency and default.  The dependent variable in each of the models is equal to one if the property 
is currently in foreclosure or REO, and zero otherwise.  The reported numbers are the changes in estimated 
probabilities of a property being in foreclosure or REO for a one standard deviation increase (for continuous 
variables) or the change induced by a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, with the remaining 
variables held at their means.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  All 
specifications include fixed effects for state, origination year, and mortgage servicer. 
 
Cash Out Refi (0,1) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1) 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1) 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1) 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
Previous Rate Reset (0,1) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
Full Documentation (0,1) -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.090*** 
Modified Loan (0,1) -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 
FICO Score -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
Months Since Origination 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Original LTV 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.211*** 0.066*** 0.212*** 
Home Price Appreciation  (HPA) -0.058*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.065*** -0.101*** 
% Change Unemployment 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
REL (Religious Adherence) 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.014 
Hispanic Fraction 0.005** 0.006*** -0.030*** 0.005** -0.029*** 
African American Fraction 0.009 0.009 0.179*** 0.008 0.173*** 
White Fraction -0.002 -0.003 0.114*** -0.003 0.116*** 
Union Memb. Private (%) 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.037** 0.037** 
Union Memb. Public (%) 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.054*** -0.032* 
REL X LTV  -0.005   -0.010 
REL X HPA  0.028***   0.031*** 
Hispanic Fract. X LTV   0.041***  0.037*** 
Hispanic Fract. X HPA   0.000  -0.005 
African Am. X LTV   -0.088***  -0.086*** 
African Am. X HPA   0.010  0.014** 
White X LTV   -0.084***  -0.085*** 
White X HPA   0.016  0.034 
Union Priv. X LTV    -0.026* -0.027* 
Union Priv. X HPA    0.003 0.003 
Union Pub. X LTV    0.078*** 0.045** 
Union Pub. X HPA    0.009 0.017** 
      
N 87,474 87,474 87,474 87,474 87,474 
   43
Table 9: Marginal Effects of Local and Borrower Specific Factors: CA, FL, AZ, and 
NV Only 
This table contains four logistic regressions examining the local and borrower specific factors influencing 
mortgage delinquency and default.  The dependent variable in each of the models is equal to one if the property 
is currently in foreclosure or REO, and zero otherwise.  The reported numbers are the changes in estimated 
probabilities of a property being in foreclosure or REO for a one standard deviation increase (for continuous 
variables) or the change induced by a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, with the remaining 
variables held at their means.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  All 
specifications include fixed effects for state, origination year, and mortgage servicer. 
 
 Primary Residence  Investment Properties 
      
Cash Out Refi (0,1) -0.095*** -0.094***  0.012 0.013 
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1) -0.046*** -0.044***  0.045*** 0.046*** 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1) 0.175*** 0.173***  0.141*** 0.141*** 
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1) 0.049*** 0.049***  0.018** 0.018** 
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1) 0.000 0.000  0.006 0.006 
Previous Rate Reset (0,1) 0.024*** 0.023***  0.017* 0.018* 
Full Documentation (0,1) -0.101*** -0.099***  -0.095*** -0.095*** 
Modified Loan (0,1) -0.183*** -0.183***  -0.203*** -0.205*** 
FICO Score -0.054*** -0.054***  -0.056*** -0.056*** 
Months Since Origination 0.007*** 0.008***  0.001 0.002 
Original LTV 0.085*** 0.086***  0.125*** 0.126*** 
Home Price Appreciation  (HPA) -0.040*** -0.037***  -0.053*** -0.053*** 
% Change Unemployment 0.014*** 0.019***  0.013*** 0.014*** 
REL (Religious Adherence)  -0.003***   -0.008** 
Hispanic Fraction  0.025***   0.008** 
African American Fraction  -0.012***   -0.006 
White Fraction  -0.011***   -0.008 
Union Memb. Private (%)  0.000   0.002 
Union Memb. Public (%)  0.005***   -0.005 
      
N 297,681 297,681  32,040 32,040 
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Table 10: Marginal Effects of Local and Borrower Specific Factors: All States Except 
CA, FL, AZ, or NV 
This table contains four logistic regressions examining the local and borrower specific factors influencing 
mortgage delinquency and default.  The dependent variable in each of the models is equal to one if the property 
is currently in foreclosure or REO, and zero otherwise.  The reported numbers are the changes in estimated 
probabilities of a property being in foreclosure or REO for a one standard deviation increase (for continuous 
variables) or the change induced by a change in a dummy variable from zero to one, with the remaining 
variables held at their means.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  All 
specifications include fixed effects for state, origination year, and mortgage servicer. 
 
 Primary Residence  Investment Properties 
      
Cash Out Refi (0,1) -0.040*** -0.040***  -0.005 -0.005 
Refi: No Cash Out (0,1) -0.027*** -0.027***  0.025*** 0.026*** 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (0,1) 0.111*** 0.110***  0.064*** 0.064*** 
Interest Only Mortgage (0,1) 0.022*** 0.022***  0.026*** 0.026*** 
Negative Amortization Permitted (0,1) -0.020*** -0.020***  -0.035*** -0.034*** 
Previous Rate Reset (0,1) 0.018*** 0.018***  0.017*** 0.017*** 
Full Documentation (0,1) -0.090*** -0.090***  -0.083*** -0.083*** 
Modified Loan (0,1) -0.109*** -0.109***  -0.125 -0.125 
FICO Score -0.037*** -0.037***  -0.038*** -0.037*** 
Months Since Origination 0.007*** 0.007***  -0.002 -0.001 
Original LTV 0.026*** 0.026***  0.054*** 0.053*** 
Home Price Appreciation  (HPA) -0.024*** -0.023***  -0.028*** -0.024*** 
% Change Unemployment 0.003*** 0.003***  0.000 0.004* 
REL (Religious Adherence)  -0.002**   0.005** 
Hispanic Fraction  0.007***   0.007** 
African American Fraction  -0.005**   0.013 
White Fraction  -0.005**   -0.001 
Union Memb. Private (%)  0.003***   0.000 
Union Memb. Public (%)  -0.002   -0.001 
      
N 408,541 408,312  55,452 55,434 
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